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Amidst a fog of political divisiveness, Judith Millerfound herself in the untenable situation of having tobreach the journalists’ code of ethics, as well as her
own personal promise of confidentiality, or go to jail.
According to the government, she had obtained illegally dis-
closed information from a high-ranking member of President
George W. Bush’s administration.  Eventually, a grand jury
issued Miller a subpoena that directed her to breach her
promise of confidentiality by revealing the identity of her
source.  Miller claimed that she had a First Amendment right
to withhold her confidential information from the grand jury.
The court disagreed and, although she never published the
information, Miller was sent to jail as punishment for protect-
ing her source. 
If nothing else, Judith Miller’s 85-day-prison term put
America on notice of the alarming rate at which the govern-
ment is using its unbridled subpoena power to splinter the
press’s traditional role as the public’s government watchdog.  In
fact, the government is currently issuing subpoenas upon
members of the press at a rate unmatched in at least 30 years.1
Additionally, the length of time that reporters are being held in
prison, as punishment for honoring their covenant of confi-
dentiality, is increasing at a similarly astonishing pace.2
Remarkably, the outcome of Judith Miller’s case could only
encourage the government to subpoena reporters in droves.3
As the government is steadily increasing its use of subpoenas
on reporters, the press’s ability to gather and disseminate infor-
mation of public concern is simultaneously weakening.4
Arguably, the scope of a reporter’s privilege should directly
correlate with the nature of the proceeding through which the
movant attempts to compel disclosure.  Courts generally adhere
to this principle, reasoning that the moving party’s countervail-
ing interests differ in degree between civil, criminal, and grand
jury proceedings.  For instance, in a criminal proceeding, the
movant/defendant who seeks to compel disclosure from a
reporter has countervailing Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
to this information.5 Conversely, a movant/defendant who
seeks to compel disclosure from a reporter in a civil proceeding
does not have a competing constitutional right to the informa-
tion.6 Thus, a reporter’s privilege is generally broader in civil
proceedings than in criminal ones.  
Interestingly, the efficacy of a grand jury’s right to compel a
reporter to disclose confidential information falls somewhere
between the criminal and civil contexts.  In our society, the
grand jury “serves the invaluable function . . . of standing
between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine whether
a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimi-
dating power or by malice and personal ill will.”7 Although a
grand jury is constitutionally mandated, it does not have a
constitutional right to a reporter’s confidential information.8
Thus, this article will explore only the proper scope of a
reporter’s privilege to withhold confidential information from
a grand jury.
I.  OVERVIEW
A.  The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
Branzburg v. Hayes9 is the only Supreme Court case that has
precisely addressed the scope of a reporter’s privileged right to
withhold confidential information from a grand jury.  In
Branzburg, the majority held that, absent a showing that the
grand jury is conducting a bad-faith investigation, the First
Amendment does not vitiate a reporter’s legal obligation to tes-
tify in front of a grand jury.10
In Branzburg, the Court consolidated three separate cases
where the reporters were asserting their right to withhold
privileged information from a grand jury investigation.  In all
three of the cases, the reporters’ ability to gather news of pub-
lic concern was conditioned on the reporters’ promise to keep
certain information confidential.  In the first case, the grand
jury was seeking to compel disclosure of the reporter’s source
after two separate stories were published; the first story was
about the illegal synthesizing of hashish from marijuana and
the second story reported on the local drug scene.  In the
other two consolidated cases, the grand juries were seeking to
compel the reporters to disclose information about the sus-
pected illegal activity of the Black Panther Party.  After hear-
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ing these three separate cases below, the outcomes in the cir-
cuit courts were inconsistent and, thus, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.11
Writing for the majority in Branzburg, Justice White held
that, absent a showing of bad faith or harassment by the grand
jury, the Constitution does not grant a reporter any privilege to
withhold information from a grand jury investigation.  Justice
White premised the Court’s conclusion on the notion that
rejecting the reporters’ privilege would not forbid or restrict the
press’s use of confidential sources.12 Accordingly, the Court did
not review the reporter’s claim under heightened scrutiny.
Initially, the Court articulated the dual purpose of a grand
jury within our government.  First, a grand jury must deter-
mine whether there is probable cause to believe that a sus-
pected person has committed a crime; and, second, it is
designed to protect innocent citizens from “unfounded crimi-
nal prosecution.”13 Furthermore, the Court concluded that
grand juries are both constitutionally mandated and deeply
“rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history.”14
Therefore, according to the Court, a grand jury’s investigative
powers are necessarily broad, including its ability to subpoena
witnesses material to its task.
After providing this backdrop, the majority rejected the
reporters’ contention that denying them a First Amendment
privilege to protect confidential sources would significantly
deter informants from providing reporters with confidential
information in the future.  Specifically, the majority explained
that the reporters’ proffered evidence in support of their
asserted privilege merely showed that reporters rely on confi-
dential sources and not that the majority’s holding would
unconstitutionally chill future informants from disclosing con-
fidential information.  Furthermore, the Court stated that the
data was unpersuasive because it included opinion polls on
this subject, which were highly speculative and completed by
self-serving reporters.  Thus, the Court concluded, “We doubt
if the informer who prefers anonymity but is sincerely inter-
ested in furnishing evidence of crime will always or very often
be deterred by the prospect of dealing with those public
authorities characteristically charged with the duty to protect
the public interest as well as his.”15 Ultimately, the Court
found that it did not need to recognize a reporter’s privilege in
order to protect the press’s ability to gather news and, there-
fore, the press’s right to withhold information from a grand
jury was no greater than an average citizens.
Alternatively, Justice Stewart’s dissent proposed a classic
balancing test designed to ensure that every reporter’s assertion
of a constitutional privilege is determined on the facts of the
case.  The dissent’s balancing test proposed that, before
attempting to compel a reporter to disclose confidential infor-
mation to a grand jury, the government must:  
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that
the newsman has infor-
mation that is clearly
relevant to a specific
probable violation of
law; (2) demonstrate
that the information
sought cannot be
obtained by alternative
means less destructive
of First Amendment
rights; and (3) demon-
strate a compelling and
overriding interest in
the information.16
Therefore, the dissent’s
approach differed from the majority’s because it opined that
limiting the scope of the reporters’ privilege to cases of bad
faith or harassment would unconstitutionally infringe on the
press’s First Amendment right to gather news.  
Similarly, the dissent contended that the majority’s rule
would cause future confidential informants to withhold infor-
mation from the press.  Justice Stewart’s dissent emphasizes
the notion that a flexible reporter’s privilege is necessary to
protect the newsgathering process and, thus, to promote the
free flow of information that the First Amendment was meant
to ensure.  In contrast to the majority, Justice Stewart believed
that the Court’s limitation of a reporter’s privilege would have
a significant chilling effect, thereby suppressing the free flow
of information.  
Notably, Justice Powell wrote a concurrence to “emphasize
what seem[ed] to [him] to be the limited nature of the Court’s
holding.”17 According to Justice Powell, the Branzburg hold-
ing was not as formalistically rigid as it may appear.  Instead,
Justice Powell stated that a reporter has a remedy against com-
pelled grand jury testimony where the reporter asserts any one
of the following claims: (1) the grand jury is conducting its
investigation in bad faith; (2) the reporter’s confidential infor-
mation has too remote and tenuous a relationship to the grand
jury’s investigation; or (3) “if [the reporter] has some other
reason to believe that his testimony implicates [a] confidential
source relationship without a legitimate need of law enforce-
ment.”18 According to Justice Powell’s concurrence, if the
reporter asserts one of these claims, then the court must bal-
ance the reporter’s freedom of press interest against the “oblig-
ation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct.”19
B.  The Judith Miller Case
Three decades after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Branzburg, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
Justice White held
that, absent a 
showing of bad
faith or harassment
.  .  ., the
Constitution does not
grant a reporter any
privilege to withhold
information from a
grand jury 
investigation. 
Court Review - Volume 43 183
184 Court Review - Volume 43 
20. 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Miller].  The opinion
was initially issued in 2005 with substantial redactions because of
its discussion of national security materials.  In re: Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  As
explained in a separate opinion a year later in which the court
concluded some of the redacted material could then be made pub-
lic, the opinion was reissued with additional pages included,
though some materials were still redacted.  This article cites to the
reissued opinion.  In between Branzburg and Miller the circuit
courts had applied the Branzburg rule inconsistently. Compare
Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th
Cir. 1987) (ordering reporter to disclose to a grand jury the iden-
tity of a confidential source who was suspected of murder), and
Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974) (ordering
reporter to reveal information to a grand jury relating to the
bombing of a government building), with In re: Williams, 766
F.Supp. 358, 370 (W.D. Pa. 1991), aff’d by an equally divided court,
963 F.2d 567, 569 (3d Cir. 1992) (quashing a grand jury subpoena
that sought identity of the reporter’s source who violated a court
order by providing the reporter with copies of documents used as
evidence in a criminal trial).
21. Joseph C. Wilson, Op-Ed, What I Didn’t Find In Africa, N.Y. TIMES,
July, 6, 2003, § 4, at 9.
22. Nancy Gibbs, The Rove Problem, TIME, July 25, 2005, at 22.
23. Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, CHI SUN-TIMES, July 14, 2003,
at 31.  
24. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1144.
25. Id. at 1146-47.
26. Id. at 1148-49.
27. Id. at 1163-83 (Tatel, J., concurring).
28. Rule 501 became effective June 1, 1975 and provides in relevant
part:  “Privilege[s]…shall be governed by the principles of com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in light of reason and experience.”  FED. R. EVID. 501.
29. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1166 (Tatel, J., concurring) (quoting Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S 1, 14 (1996)).  
30. Id. at 1168 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 1169.
of Columbia Circuit heard In
re: Grand Jury Subpoena,
Judith Miller.20 In actuality,
the events leading up to
Miller began when Joseph
Wilson, a former ambassador
of the United States, wrote a
New York Times op-ed piece
claiming that President Bush
knowingly misled the
American public about the
presence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq.21
Apparently, in an attempt to
discredit Wilson, someone within the White House informed
members of the press, including Miller, that Wilson’s wife,
Valerie Plame, was a CIA agent.22 Thereafter, the Chicago Sun-
Times reported Plame’s identity in an article that challenged the
accuracy of Wilson’s conclusions.23
In response, a grand jury subpoenaed Judith Miller in order
to determine whether a government agent had illegally dis-
closed Plame’s identity as a CIA official.  Interestingly, Miller
had not even published the information the grand jury
sought.24 In any event, she refused to comply with the grand
jury subpoena and, therefore, the district court held her in
contempt of court.  Miller challenged the grand jury’s power to
compel disclosure of this information as a violation of her First
Amendment rights.  Significantly, Miller’s First Amendment
challenge required the court to revisit Branzburg.   
The majority began its opinion by observing that Branzburg
controlled Judith Miller’s First Amendment claim and that, in
Branzburg, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the
First Amendment does not provide a reporter’s privilege,
absent a showing of bad faith or harassment.25 Thus, the
Miller court pressed the reporter to distinguish her case from
Branzburg.  The reporter failed to offer any distinguishing
facts, and even upon independent contemplation the Miller
court was unable to find an adequate distinction.  Instead, the
reporter contended that the Constitution protected her from
testifying in front of the grand jury because Branzburg was a
plurality decision and, therefore, Justice Powell’s concurrence
was binding.  However, the Miller court adamantly rejected the
reporter’s argument and concluded that Justice Powell both
joined and agreed with the majority’s decision.26
In a concurring opinion, Judge Tatel concluded that
Branzburg merely foreclosed the reporter’s privilege pursuant
to the First Amendment.  However, he quoted language in
Branzburg that recognized Congress’s power to enact a quali-
fied statutory reporter’s privilege.27 Thus, he concluded that
Branzburg did not intend to absolutely foreclose a reporter’s
protection from compelled disclosure, absent a showing of bad
faith or harassment.  Furthermore, Tatel stated that after
Branzburg, Congress enacted Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which created a qualified reporter’s privilege.28
Judge Tatel proposed that “reason and experience dictate a
[qualified] privilege for reporters’ confidential sources.”29
First, he noted that “reporters ‘depend upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust.’”30 Therefore, denying a qualified privi-
lege would create a chilling effect.  Second, Tatel contended
that the resulting benefit of denying any qualified privilege
would be modest.  Lastly, he stated that legal developments
since Branzburg, including the trend among the states towards
recognizing a reporter’s privilege, provided a basis to depart
from Branzburg.     
Notably, Tatel recognized the fact that the information
sought by the grand jury related to an illegal “leak of informa-
tion” rather than the commission of an extrinsic crime.31
Moreover, Tatel concluded that there are circumstances where
a reporter’s ability to obtain illegally disclosed information
would be in the public’s interest.  Thus, for public policy rea-
sons, where a qualified reporter’s privilege is at issue, it is nec-
essary for courts to balance the interests between the reporter
and the government.  According to Tatel, where the subject of
the grand jury investigation concerns illegally disclosed infor-
mation, the harm and news value of the leak are the disposi-
tive factors.  In conclusion, Tatel stated that “were the leak at
Judge Tatel 
proposed that
“reason and 
experience dictate
a [qualified] 
privilege for
reporters’ 
confidential
sources.”
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issue in [Miller] less harmful
to national security or more
vital to public debate, or had
the grand jury’s special coun-
sel failed to demonstrate its
need for the reporter’s evi-
dence” he might have felt
compelled to grant Miller’s
motion to quash the sub-
poena.32
II.  DISCUSSION 
The following discussion
attempts to illustrate how and
why Branzburg should not
control cases that, like Miller, deal with “illegal disclosures of
confidential government information.”  Initially, it distin-
guishes Miller from Branzburg based on the nature of the
reporters’ information.  Relying on this distinction, it contends
that the First Amendment protects a reporter from disclosing
the identity of a confidential government-agent informant.  In
addition, it proposes a reporter’s privilege whose scope is
guided by the public’s interest in the reporters’ information and
concludes that this approach is the best way to strike a balance
between the competing constitutional interests of the govern-
ment and the press.  It then examines Branzburg’s reasoning
against Miller’s facts to support the logic of its distinction.
Lastly, this section applies its proposed rule to current conflicts
between the press and the government in order to demonstrate
its propriety.
A.  Distinguishing Miller from Branzburg
Despite the Miller court’s conclusory pronouncement that
the case was indistinguishable from Branzburg, the very nature
of the information sought in the two cases is distinguishable.33
The confidential information sought in Branzburg was evi-
dence containing the identity of self-purported drug dealers
and drug users and the suspected illegal activity of a radical
minority group.34 On the other hand, the information sought
in Miller related to the identity of a government official who
was suspected of unlawfully leaking information regarding
government activity.35 Thus, Miller is distinguishable from
Branzburg because a First Amendment reporter’s privilege to
withhold only the identity of confidential government-agent
informants will particularly foster the detection of governmen-
tal misconduct. 36 Additionally, such a narrow reporter’s privi-
lege will not significantly impede on a grand jury’s function of
prosecuting extrinsic crimes, which was of paramount concern
in Branzburg. 
Quoting Branzburg, the Miller court reasoned that a
reporter’s attempt to conceal a crime, via an assertion of a
reporter’s privilege, is unconditionally outweighed by a grand
jury’s good-faith interest in punishing the crime.37 However,
this reasoning is misplaced in the context of “illegal disclosure
of confidential government information” because it does not
consider the nature of the information.  This distinction is nec-
essary because “information generated from press reports
about government, serves as a ‘powerful antidote to any abuses
of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally
chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people
responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.’
”38 Therefore, the scope of a reporter’s privilege should protect
reporters from compelled disclosure of their confidential gov-
ernment-agent informants, provided that the information
properly relates to an abuse of government power.    
B.  The First Amendment Provides a Qualified
Reporter’s Privilege
It is axiomatic that the purpose of the First Amendment is
to protect the public against the government’s control of
thoughts, behavior, and expression.39 The text of the First
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or, of the press.”40 Various
interpretations of the disjunctive “or” have ranged from claims
that it does not create any additional rights beyond freedom of
speech to claims that the Press Clause provides the press with
“special rights.”41 The Supreme Court, however, has refused to
recognize that the First Amendment’s disjunctive “or” creates
special protections for the press.    
Undeniably, the function of the press is to gather and dis-
seminate information.  Within this raison d’etre, “the press’s
most important [role] is to [gather and disseminate informa-
tion about] the government.”42 The press’s ability to obtain
confidential information from government officials is unques-
[A] narrow
reporter’s privilege
will not 
significantly
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tionably its most effective means for providing the public with
information about government activity.43 Accordingly, the
press must have a right to keep the identity of their official
government sources confidential in order to elicit information
pertaining to otherwise inaccessible government activity.  In
this sense, “a press right to gather information is compatible
with the concept of freedom of the press understood by many
politicians and political theorists of the early American repub-
lic.”44
Notably, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Speech
Clause broadly in order to vehemently protect an individual’s
right to freedom of expression.  Most often, whenever the
Court extends First Amendment protection, it relies on the
notion that “public discussion and debate of issues, and criti-
cism and investigation of public bodies are essential to a free
society.”45 However, the ability to freely express oneself is
severely impaired without the constitutionally protected right
of reporters to obtain confidential government information
that will likely influence public opinion.  In fact, the many
Supreme Court cases emphasizing the importance of an “unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately pre-
vail” implicitly rely on the speakers’ ability to obtain informa-
tion that will influence their assessment of the truth.46 Thus,
protection of a reporter’s right to gather (and subsequently
publish) confidential information is required under the First
Amendment in order to protect the sanctity of our self-govern-
ing process.  
C.  A Proposed Qualified Privilege with Respect to
Confidential Government Sources
This article proposes a narrow rule that does not purport to
grant reporters an absolute privilege in every case where a
reporter has obtained illegally disclosed, confidential informa-
tion from a government agent.  Instead, where a reporter has
received confidential information from a government-agent
informant, the reporter should have a qualified privilege that
protects him or her from compelled disclosure only where the
reporter establishes the following two conditions: (1) the dis-
closure was related to pos-
sible government miscon-
duct47 and (2) reporting the
information to the general
public did not injure the
nation’s military, diplomatic
or national security inter-
ests or any other similarly
compelling government
interest.  Consequently, a
reporter could successfully
assert a privilege only
where the illegal disclosure
of information, which the
grand jury is seeking to
punish, was in the public’s
interest.  
Notably, this proposed rule is similar to the standard that
the Supreme Court implemented to define the scope of a pres-
idential privilege in United States v. Nixon.48 Applying this
standard to Miller is logical because “any privilege of access to
governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint
dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing
interests in security or confidentiality.”49 Therefore, a reporter
should have a privilege to withhold the identity of a confiden-
tial, government-agent informant from a grand jury in the lim-
ited situations where the privilege advances the public’s First
Amendment interest in facilitating an effective process of self-
government.50
Admittedly, the second prong of this proposed standard is
difficult to clearly define and, therefore, it does not appear to
provide a substantial degree of guidance for all interested par-
ties.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has relied similarly on
a “national/public security” limitation in First Amendment
cases51 as well as in other areas of law.52 Furthermore, as long
as courts insist that the government’s “threat to national secu-
rity” claim is asserted with the same level of specificity as the
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there is significant evidence which shows that reporters exten-
sively rely on confidential informants).
reporter’s claim of “possible government misconduct,” then
certain underlying principles will emerge to help clarify the
second prong’s limitations.  Most importantly, however, the dif-
ficulty in administering this proposed rule is not an adequate
reason for abandoning well-established First Amendment
objectives.  
Notably, the Branzburg Court rejected an application of
heightened scrutiny because it would have required courts to
“distinguish [. . .] between the value of enforcing different
criminal laws.”53 The Court stated that “[b]y requiring testi-
mony from a reporter in investigations involving some crimes
but not in others, [courts] would be making a value judgment
that a legislature had declined to make . . . .”54 However, this
proposed rule applies only to “illegal disclosures of informa-
tion.”55 Accordingly, the proposed scope of this reporter’s priv-
ilege is not controlled by the classification of the underlying
crime that the grand jury is investigating, but rather is con-
trolled by the public value of the illegal disclosure.
Considering that this proposed rule is designed to prevent the
government from abusing its power, Branzburg’s approach of
blindly deferring to the other branches of government is
patently ineffective.
D.  Applying Branzburg’s Reasoning to Miller’s Facts
Preliminarily, Branzburg recognized that reporters have cer-
tain First Amendment rights to gather news.56 Unfortunately,
however, the Branzburg Court failed to elaborate on the extent
of those rights and as a result it appears to propose that a
reporter’s constitutionally protected right to withhold confi-
dential information exists only where the grand jury’s interests
stem from bad faith or harassment.  However, “[if] . . .
Branzburg only requires balancing where a grand jury sub-
poena is issued in bad faith or for purpose of harassment, no
balancing test would ever be required:  [Any individual’s] legit-
imate First Amendment interest would always outweigh a sub-
poena issued in bad faith or harassment.57 Therefore, a strict
interpretation of the Branzburg majority’s rule, which the
Miller court applied, results in an illusory rule that pretends to
provide a reporter with protection from compelled disclosure
in form, but provides little protection in function.58
Accordingly, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion logically, as
he expressed, clarified and broadened the majority’s scope of a
reporter’s privilege.  
Significantly, the
Branzburg majority rejected
the reporters’ asserted privi-
lege under the First
Amendment.  The Court
relied primarily on the fol-
lowing two factors before
reaching this conclusion:
(1) the case did not imple-
ment the reporters’ First
Amendment right to gather
news; and (2) its decision
promoted the grand jury’s
purpose of protecting the
public’s interest. Interestingly, based on these factors, Branzburg’s
reasoning is misplaced in the context of the Miller facts.
First, the Branzburg Court rejected the reporters’ First
Amendment claim by relying heavily on the notion that “the
case did not present an issue of restricting the press from using
confidential sources.”59 In fact, in the process of rejecting the
proposition that the First Amendment “protects a newsman’s
agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source,”60 the
Court noted that this conclusion “involves no restraint on . . .
the type or quality of information reporters may seek to
acquire, nor does it threaten the vast bulk of confidential rela-
tionships between reporters and their sources.”61 In reaching
this conclusion, the Branzburg Court found that the reporters’
empirical data did not prove that its decision would have a sig-
nificant deterrent effect on the press’s future ability to obtain
confidential information.  Instead, it merely showed that
reporters rely on confidential informants.  Nevertheless, the
Branzburg Court did acknowledge that its rule would impose
an incidental burden on the press’s ability to gather news.62
Notwithstanding this undetermined burden, the Court pre-
sumed that without evidence proving otherwise, its decision
would not unconstitutionally chill the newsgathering process.  
However, if one can accept the following four assumptions,
then Branzburg improperly presumed that a denial of any
reporter’s privilege, absent a showing of bad faith or harass-
ment, does not create a chilling effect:63 (1) reporters rely on
informants for news;64 (2) many informants will not provide a
reporter with information unless the reporter promises to keep
their identity confidential;65 (3) the use of unbridled subpoena
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tions on a reporter’s privilege have a “censoring effect . . .  about
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Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 106 (2002).    
76. See Gonzales, 382 F.Supp. 2d at 462 n.3 (noting that in 2001 the
number of classified government documents reportedly rose
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77. Langley & Levine, supra note 33, at 45.    
78. Id. at 20.
power will deter informants
from disclosing confidential
information;66 and (4) the use
of unbridled subpoena power
will deter reporters from pub-
lishing confidential informa-
tion.67 Even assuming that the
existing data does not
absolutely refute Branzburg’s
presumption, common sense
suggests that the Branzburg
presumption was backwards
because, all things being equal, an informant is more likely to
provide a reporter with confidential information where the
reporter promises that the informant’s identity will remain
anonymous.68 Consequently, Branzburg’s decision to compel
the reporters to disclose their confidential information does
burden the press’s ability to gather news.69
Moreover, the quantum of evidence that Branzburg
demands from the reporters in order to overcome its presump-
tion is unattainable because it is almost impossible to quantify
the deterrent effect.70 Similarly, “the magnitude of the [bur-
den] a privilege imposes on [the courts’] truth-seeking [func-
tion] depends on exactly the same empirically unverified fac-
tor that determines the benefit gained by a privilege: namely,
the extent to which people would communicate in the absence
of the privilege.”71 Although this empirical data is nonexis-
tent, there is increasingly more evidence of specific instances
where Branzburg’s deterrent effect has burdened the press’s
ability to gather and report news.72 This evidence demon-
strates that the deterrent effect manifests itself most promi-
nently between reporters and government-agent informants.73
Thus, Branzburg’s rule imposes a burden on the press’s right to
gather news; however, this burden is constitutionally signifi-
cant only where it adversely affects the press’s ability to gather
information about possible government misconduct.
Second, Branzburg rejected the reporters’ privilege in order
to protect the grand jury’s purpose of aiding in the detection of
criminal activity.  According to Branzburg, the grand jury’s abil-
ity to fully perform this function ultimately helps to protect the
public’s security.  However, when the reporter’s information
relates to issues involving government misconduct, recogniz-
ing a reporter’s privilege to protect confidential sources fur-
thers the detection of wrongdoing.74 Hence, the proposed rule
set forth here attempts to provide a reporter’s privilege only
where it will not run contrary to the public’s security interest.
Meanwhile, if a reporter’s privilege does not threaten the pub-
lic’s security, then it is presumably advancing the public’s inter-
est in a free-flow of information, which facilitates our self-gov-
erning process.
E. An Actual Demonstration of How This Proposed
Rule Can Co-exist with Branzburg to Clarify the
Precise Scope of a Reporter’s First Amendment
Privilege 
Indeed, Branzburg’s rule is appropriate in the arena of the
facts in which it was decided because a grand jury’s interest in
prosecuting extrinsic crimes undoubtedly outweighs reporters’
interest in protecting the identity of their confidential, non-
government sources.  Therefore, notwithstanding the con-
tention that Branzburg does cause a chilling effect, its reason-
ing should support a grand jury’s unbridled subpoena power
only where the grand jury seeks information relating to an
extrinsic crime.  However, Branzburg should not apply where a
reporter obtains confidential information from a government-
agent informant for the following three reasons.  First, govern-
ment abuse is an evil that must be curtailed through media
exposure.75 Second, secrecy within the government has
steadily increased since Branzburg.76 Third, government mis-
conduct is unlikely to be disclosed to reporters without the
reporters’ legitimate ability to promise confidentiality.77
Notably, Branzburg’s analysis explicitly considered the
effects that its rule would have only on the relationship
between minority groups (informants) and reporters.  In
doing so, the Court “[bespoke] a palpable focus upon both
the confidential source at issue—i.e. dissident political or cul-
tural groups, and the [extrinsic] crimes that they had
allegedly committed.”78 Thus, Branzburg concluded that
denying the reporters’ asserted privilege was unlikely to deter
informants from disclosing confidential information to the
[T]he quantum of
evidence that
Branzburg
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presumption is
unattainable . . . .
press because the informants are “members of a minority polit-
ical or cultural group that relies heavily on the media to propa-
gate its views . . . .”79 Evidently, Branzburg did not expressly
consider the deterrent effects that its rule may have on the
relationship between government-agent informants and
reporters. 
Applying the proposed rule to the Miller case presents a
unique challenge.  It appears that the press’s publication of
Valerie Plame’s identity did in fact impair our government’s
national security efforts because it both crippled Plame’s abil-
ity to carry out any future covert operations and allowed for-
eign intelligence services to learn how the CIA operates by
tracing Plame’s steps and contacts in their countries.80 In addi-
tion, the leak may well have put Plame’s life in jeopardy, as well
as the lives of her friends and associates.81 In sum, the public
value of the information was minimal compared to the harm
that it caused.  
However, Judith Miller never actually published this infor-
mation.  This is a pertinent fact because it is widely understood
within the political sphere of journalism that reporters rou-
tinely rely on off-the-record confidential disclosures as a
means of ensuring that the reporter has sufficient background
information to publish credible and accurate news.82 Thus, a
reporter’s privilege that does not absolutely protect the press’s
ability to merely obtain, as opposed to publish, information
from a confidential government-agent informant appears to be
constitutionally deficient.  As Judge Tatel stated in Miller,
reporters’ interests mirror the public’s.83 Accordingly, reporters
should have the initial freedom to obtain confidential govern-
ment information, and then to subsequently determine
whether it is consistent with their duty to publish that infor-
mation.  In other words, unless and until the reporter affirma-
tively reports confidential government information which
harms the public’s interest, he or she should have an absolute
privilege to gather it.  
Although Miller’s case is unique, there are several recent
developments where a pure application of the proposed rule
helps to demonstrate its propriety.  For example, on November
2, 2005, the Washington Post published an article that reported
that the United States government had set up secret CIA terror-
ist prison camps across the world in order to skirt America’s
higher standards of prisoner treatment.84 In response, the CIA
formally referred the matter to the Justice Department, suggest-
79. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694-95 (emphasis added).
80. Nancy Gibbs, The Rove Problem, TIME MAGAZINE, July 25, 2005, at
25, 34.
81. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1178-79 (Tatel, J., concurring).
82. Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 229, 234 (1971).  In fact, it is quite likely that the Plame
leak was an example of this practice.  Gibbs, supra note 78, at 24,
25-32.  
83. Miller, 397 F.3d at 1000 (Tatal, J., concurring).  
84. DANA PRIEST, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH.
POST, Nov.  2, 2005, at A1.  
85. Wolf Blitzer, (CNN television broadcast Nov. 8, 2005) available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0511/08/sitroom.04.ht
ml.  This is the same preliminary action that the CIA took before
Judith Miller was eventually subpoenaed by a grand jury.  Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The information relates to possible government misconduct
because if the allegations are true then the government’s action
may have violated United States law.  Furthermore, disclosing this
information does not appear to injure the public’s security because
the location of the prisons was not revealed. 
89. David E. Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at § 1.
90. Id. (quoting President Bush).
ing that a government agent may
have illegally disclosed classified
information to the reporter.85
There was speculation that a
grand jury would eventually
issue a subpoena upon the
reporter, Dana Priest, in an effort
to learn the identity of the
reporter’s confidential source.86
If a grand jury were to issue a
subpoena to Priest, the Miller
decision has created a precedent
that will severely hinder the
reporter’s ability to assert a testi-
monial privilege.87 However,
under the proposed rule, the
reporter’s privilege would protect Priest from compelled disclo-
sure as long as the reporter could prove that disclosure of this
information did not threaten the nation’s security.88
Similarly, in December 2005, the press reported that, in
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President
Bush authorized a secret surveillance program whereby the gov-
ernment has been intercepting telephone and email communi-
cations between the United States and Afghanistan.89 The con-
troversial aspect of Bush’s surveillance program, however, lies in
the fact that the government is authorized to spy on people with
suspected links to terrorist organizations without first getting a
court’s approval.  Due to this departure from traditional proce-
dure, some security officials have questioned the legality of
Bush’s program.  In an address to the American people, Bush
stated that information about his surveillance program was
“improperly provided to news organizations.”90 Thus, the gov-
ernment could conceivably attempt to compel disclosure of the
reporters’ confidential source via a grand jury subpoena.  
If the government did issue subpoenas, the proposed rule
requires the press to comply with the subpoena unless they can
show that publishing this information related to possible gov-
ernment misconduct and it did not injure the nation’s security.
In this instance, it appears that the press’s reports do relate to
possible government misconduct because it is unclear whether
the President is authorized, under the Constitution, to imple-
ment this surveillance program.  However, it is quite possible
that publishing this information did threaten the security of
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91. Id. (quoting President Bush).  But see Paul Farhi, N.Y. Times Held
Off Publishing Domestic-Eavesdropping Story, PHILA. INQUIRER,
December 18, 2005, at A22 (reporting that the New York Times
purposely delayed publishing this story until it “satisfied itself
through more reporting that it could write the story without
exposing ‘any intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities that
are not already on the public record.’”).
our nation because it “alert[ed] our enemies and endanger[ed]
our country.”91 Thus, even if President Bush’s tactics are
unlawful, a court should compel disclosure of the reporter’s
confidential government-agent informant only if it finds that,
by publishing the information, the reporter actually hindered
the government’s ability to prevent future terrorist attacks.   
Unquestionably, in these modern-day examples, the confi-
dential information was or may have been illegally disclosed.
However, in these examples, the illegal disclosure arguably
benefited the public because it contributed to the free flow of
information about government conduct, which is required to
protect the sanctity of our self-governing process.  Therefore,
in the Miller context, the scope of a reporter’s privilege directly
implements First Amendment rights and the Branzburg rea-
sons for strictly denying such a privilege must be examined in
light of the reporter’s countervailing freedom of press.
III.  CONCLUSION
The First Amendment should provide reporters with a
meaningful degree of protection from grand jury subpoenas
that seek the identity of a confidential government-agent infor-
mant.  This protection is necessary in order to ensure that the
press can effectively gather and report information relating to
government misconduct.  In addition, a rule that provides
reporters with a qualified privilege in the narrow context of
“illegally disclosed confidential government information”
would not conflict with either the rule or the reasoning in
Branzburg.  On the contrary, it respects Branzburg’s desire to
protect the public’s interest by promoting a grand jury’s ability
to prosecute criminal activity.  However, it recognizes that
applying Branzburg in the context of Miller suppresses this pre-
cise concern because it inhibits the press’s ability to serve as
the government’s watchdog.  Finally, since Branzburg the
press’s reliance on confidential government-agent informants
has significantly increased and, therefore, Branzburg’s refusal to
extend the press’s First Amendment right to gather news
should be reconsidered in the context of the Miller facts.
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